Sacrifice in the Post-Kantian Tradition: Perspectivism, Intersubjectivity, and Recognition (SUNY series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy)
Paolo Diego Bubbio
Language: English
Pages: 226
ISBN: 1438452527
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
An examination of the philosophical notion of sacrifice from Kant to Nietzsche.
In this book, Paolo Diego Bubbio offers an alternative to standard philosophical accounts of the notion of sacrifice, which generally begin with the hermeneutic and postmodern traditions of the twentieth century, starting instead with the post-Kantian tradition of the nineteenth century. He restructures the historical development of the concept of sacrifice through a study of Kant, Solger, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, and shows how each is indebted to Kant and has more in common with him than is generally acknowledged. Bubbio argues that although Kant sought to free philosophical thought from religious foundations, he did not thereby render the role of religious claims philosophically useless. This makes it possible to consider sacrifice as a regulative and symbolic notion, and leads to an unorthodox idea of sacrifice: not the destruction of something for the sake of something else, but rather a kenotic emptying, conceived as a withdrawal or a “making room” for others.
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to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition […].13 These lines are followed by the famous reference to Copernicus, which made generations of scholars talk about Kant’s “Copernican turn” or even “Copernican revolution.” And it was indeed a revolution: in fact,
no existence external to reason should be taken as meaning that it exclusively has a social function. This interpretation effectively turns Hegel’s account into a kind of instrumentalism or expressivism (although a socially based rather than individualistic form of expressivism), with the concept of God conceived as a merely useful instrument whose worth is measured by how effective it is in explaining social phenomena. Regarding norms and values in general (but including religious
general and Fear and Trembling in particular have the advantage of claiming autonomy for the realm of religion. Kierkegaard wants faith to be more autonomous from ethics than Hegel typically concedes (or is usually regarded as conceding). If my interpretation of Fear and Trembling is correct, the core of Kierkegaard’s message is precisely a notion of regulativity that can be applied to the religious realm (what I have called regulative contextualism). Third, against Kant and Hegel, Kierkegaard
Philosophy,” in W. Desmond, E.-O. Onnasch and P. Cruysberghs (eds.), Philosophy and Religion in German Idealism. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004), 93. 64.Cf. Redding, Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought, 228. 65.Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 7:§25/44. 66.Cf. Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760–1860, 227. 67.Brandom seems to suggest such an instrumentalist view when he insists that “For Hegel all transcendental constitution is social institution.” Robert B. Brandom, Tales of the Mighty
Green has challenged. The relation of Kierkegaard to Kant has been addressed by a significant number of scholars in the last century: Emil Brunner, “Das Grundproblem der Philosophic bei Kant und Kierkegaard,” Zwischen den Zeiten 2, 6 (1924): 31–47; Alfred Baeumler, “Kierkegaard und Kant über die Reinheit des Herzens,” Zwischen den Zeiten 3, 2 (1925): 182–187; Helmut Fahrenbach, “Kierkegaards ethische Existenzanalyse (als Korrektiv der Kantisch-idealistischen Moralphilosophie),” in M. Theunissen