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Building on the strengths of the first edition, the second edition of the Irwin Nicomachean Ethics features a revised translation (with little editorial intervention), expanded notes (including a summary of the argument of each chapter), an expanded Introduction, and a revised glossary.
prone to intemperance than self-discipline. We describe as more contrary to the mean, then, those extremes in the direction of which we tend to go; this is why intemperance, an excess, is more contrary to temperance. Chapter 9 Enough has been said, then, to show that virtue of character is a mean, and in what sense it is so; that it is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of de®ciency; and that it is such because it is the sort of thing able to hit the mean in feelings and actions.
people, and one may fail to live up to its requirements both by failing to give away money when one should (which is stinginess) and giving away money when one should not (which is wastefulness). We can also see how one's character may consist partly in two `opposite' vices, and Aristotle explicitly says (IV.1, 1121a±b) that some of the characteristics of wastefulness (such as spending money when one should not) are commonly found with certain characteristics of stinginess (such as taking money
correctness, it is clear that good deliberation does not consist in every kind. For the incontinent or the bad person will achieve by calculation what he proposes as required, so that, though he will have deliberated correctly, he will have gained a great evil. Having deliberated well, however, seems to be something good, since the sort of correctness in deliberation that comprises good deliberation is the sort that achieves something good. But it is also possible to achieve something good
does not. Chapter 10 The same person cannot be practically wise and incontinent at the same time. We have shown that a practically wise person is at the same time good in character. Again, a person is practically wise not only by knowing, but also by being disposed to act; and the incontinent person is not disposed to act. (Nothing prevents a clever person being incontinent. This is why certain people sometimes seem to be practically wise but incontinent, because cleverness and practical wisdom
person loves not what is good for him, but what seems good; this, however, will make no difference, since we shall say that this is what seems worthy of love. There are three reasons, then, for loving something. Affection for soulless objects is not called friendship, since the affection is not mutual, nor is there any wishing good to the object (it would presumably be absurd to wish good to one's wine ± if anything, one wishes that it keep, so that one may have it oneself ). But people say that