The New Institutional Economics of Corruption (Routledge Frontiers of Political Economy)
Language: English
Pages: 276
ISBN: 0415406935
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
This book constitutes a thorough analysis of the phenomenon of corruption, as seen from the perspective of New Institutional Economics - one of the most influential new schools of thought in the social sciences of the past decade.
Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy
Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything
Turning Point: End of the Growth Paradigm
contributors 1 Corrupt contracting: exploring the analytical capacity of New Institutional Economics and New Economic Sociology xi xii xiv 1 JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, MARKUS TAUBE AND MATTHIAS SCHRAMM 2 Corruption – its spread and decline 16 HARTMUT SCHWEITZER 3 Why should one trust in corruption? The linkage between corruption, norms and social capital 40 PETER GRAEFF 4 Corruption trends 59 CHRISTIAN BJØRNSKOV AND MARTIN PALDAM 5 Trust and corruption 76 ERIC M. USLANER 6
take control over the joint venture altogether and the foreign partner may have little recourse, particularly if it lacks majority ownership. The following case study from Central Africa provides an example: A Western company was looking for a joint venture partner in a project to make and sell office machinery. It selected a prominent local businessman who had no technical expertise but was closely associated with the national president. The project was a commercial success, but the original
Eddy case was a test case brought by the US Department of Justice in 1999. In December 1999, US company Metcalfe & Eddy agreed to pay a civil penalty of US$400,000 and US$50,000 costs incurred by US government investigators in connection with its activities in Egypt.17 It also agreed to institute remedial actions, including modifications to its FCPA compliance programme. Metcalfe & Eddy obtained two contracts, worth a total of US$36m, in connection with the US-funded modernisation of Alexandria’s
dilemma that modern states have tried to deal with through recourse to compulsory taxation. But third-party enforcers of corrupt dealings, with the possible exception of mafia organizations, cannot use violent resources in order to be paid for their protection services. They must therefore also police their ‘extractive’ activities in order to control and incentivize payments from partners in corrupt transactions. On the other hand, since the essence of protection consists of the ability to impose
Nizza Monferrato (ibid.). Also, Odasso used part of the cash bribes in party activities, buying, among other things, 1,600 membership cards for his party (for a total amount of 160 million lira), financing electoral campaigns for his and allied parties (La Repubblica, 17 January 2002) and distributing generous gifts (70 million lira for ‘Christmas’ presents, including watches worth up to 14 million apiece) to various fellow politicians. As he himself declared, ‘I paid [for electoral] dinners,