The Invisible Hand of Power: An Economic Theory of Gate Keeping (Modern Heterodox Economics)

The Invisible Hand of Power: An Economic Theory of Gate Keeping (Modern Heterodox Economics)

Language: English

Pages: 224

ISBN: 1848935242

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

This is an innovative study of the techniques of domination, based on financial markets, judicial systems, academia and international relations, across North America and post-Soviet Russia. Ultimately, Oleinik seeks to provide an alternative to mainstream economic analyses of power.

The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good

It's All for Sale: The Control of Global Resources

Crash of the Titans: Greed, Hubris, the Fall of Merrill Lynch, and the Near-Collapse of Bank of America

Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications

Modern Classical Economics and Reality: A Spectral Analysis of the Theory of Value and Distribution (Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science, Volume 2)

Economic Evolution: An Inquiry into the Foundations of the New Institutional Economics (Economics as Social Theory)












Research Methodology, 10 (2007), pp. 173–84. � 19.   Shatz, Peer Review, pp. 86–9. � 20.   Shatz, Peer Review, p. 16. Similar negative consequences are attributed to government regulation of product quality in the markets. ‘If the government regulates product quality in a way that reduces choice, there is a loss of freedom, which is a public good itself, since it cannot be denied to any consumer and is enjoyed by all consumers simultaneously’ (Hamilton, Sunding and Zilberman, ‘Public Goods and

Buchanan, R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock (eds), Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1980), pp. 3–15. Public choice theory does not consider interactions between the four types of actors. Instead, its advocates focus on bilateral transactions, for instance, between voters and legislators, legislators and bureaucrats and so on. Let us consider some of these pairs in more detail.9I avoid using the term ‘dyad’ here because of its connection

policies in Japan in the late 1990s induced the process of concentration in the banking industry because regional banks did not get access to the bailout funds, which only amplified structural biases favouring the ‘selected few’ (J. M. Herbener, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Miracle’, Mises Daily (20 September 1990), at [accessed 10 October 2012]). � 9.   The corresponding data were retrieved from and from, the Bureau of Economic Analysis website.

formal requirement for providing legal advice. The division between lawyers and paralegals (individuals who have relevant expertise without meeting formal requirements) is a case in point. One type of competition Mr. Gervais worries about is a new class of advisers who have made inroads into what was traditionally a lawyer’s bread and butter – areas such as estate planning and tax planning. ‘There has been a definite erosion of practices to paralegals and tax advisers. We must use technology to

homogenous, e.g. the individual had a choice between being unemployed and having some job, then the interests of the parties involved would not form a constellation. Namely, the unemployed would be a clear loser in this situation. The dual labour market takes particularly manifest forms in Japan. The J-firm, a country-specific form of the economic organization in Japan, signs long-term incomplete contracts with its employees.12M. Aoki, Economie japonaise: information, motivations et marchandage

Download sample