State Violence, Collusion and the Troubles: Counter Insurgency, Government Deviance and Northern Ireland
Language: English
Pages: 256
ISBN: 0745331475
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
The period in Northern Ireland known as 'the Troubles' (1968-98) seemed to have been conclusively ended by the official peace process. But recent violence from dissident Republicans shows that tensions from the past remain unresolved.
State Violence, Collusion and the Troubles reveals disturbing unanswered questions about the use of state violence during this period. Maurice Punch documents in chilling detail how the British government turned to desperate, illegal measures in a time of crisis, disregarding domestic and international law. He broadens out his analysis to consider other cases of state violence against ‘insurgent groups’ in Spain and South Africa.
This is the story of how the British state collaborated with violent groups and directly participated in illegal violence. It also raises urgent questions about why states around the world continue to deploy such violence rather than seeking durable political settlements.
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‘Bloody Sunday’ and the Troubles 11 the final accountability must rest with the British state and with successive British administrations governing as the embodiment of that state. One interpretation of this gross failure, and the Troubles are plainly open to multiple interpretation from diverse disciplinary and ideological viewpoints, is that it was Britain’s last major colonial conflict. This was played out in the ‘neglected colony of a decaying imperial power’ (English 2004:124). But it was
part of the remarkable metamorphosis following peace that sometimes arch-enemies have to learn to work together. And that a former IRA activist, who planted bombs in London in 1973 and spent time in prison (Simpson 2010:64), could become a spokesperson on policing in the Legislative Assembly at Stormont. Moreover, the seemingly intractable opponent of republicanism and a rabid unionist stalwart, the Reverend Ian Paisley, was roundly praised on stepping down as First Minister of the Northern
American government was opposed to the Islamic regime in Iran and adamant about not doing deals with regimes held to be supportive of terrorism. And yet it was trying to transfer funds to groups in Iran that might persuade Islamic Jihad in Lebanon to release American hostages. The overriding argument used against this conduct is that a concession to insurgents by one government Punch T02427 01 text 56 02/02/2012 11:10 State Terror and Insurgent Terrorism 57 will work as encouragement to
took an active part not only in selecting the targets but also in the actual attacks. Indeed, the FRU, according to Davies (1999), passed this concern up the hierarchy through an ‘MISR’ (Military Intelligence Source Report): ... over the next few days, however, nothing came back from Downing Street or the JIS to the Force Research Unit officers; no advice, no instructions and no orders. There was no suggestion from any political, military or security service source suggesting that anything must
that as young privates they felt intimidated by the military police questioning them and gave them the answers they thought they wanted to hear, while one said he simply signed a prepared statement. Indeed, they may eventually have come to believe in this as true and really ‘real’. Vaclav Havel has referred to this as coming to ‘live in the lie’; and before the South African Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) the notorious former Minister of Police, Adrian Vlok, persistently denied