Sherman's March to the Sea 1864: Atlanta to Savannah (Campaign, Volume 179)

Sherman's March to the Sea 1864: Atlanta to Savannah (Campaign, Volume 179)

David Smith

Language: English

Pages: 100

ISBN: 1846030358

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

The March to the Sea was the culmination of Union General William T. Sherman's 1864 campaign during the American Civil War (1861-1865) and was a devastating example of "total war." Confederate hopes in 1864 hinged on frustrating Union forces in the field and forcing Abraham Lincoln out of office in the November elections. However, this optimism was dampened by Sherman's success in the battle of Atlanta that same year.

Riding on the wave of this victory, Sherman hoped to push his forces into Confederate territory, but his plan was hindered by a Confederate threat to the army's supply lines.
After much delay, he boldly chose to abandon these, forcing the army to live off the land for the entirety of the 285-mile march to Savannah, destroying all war-making capabilities of the enemy en route, and inflicting suffering not only on Confederate troops, but also on the civilian population. Despite the vilification that this brutal tactic earned him, the march was a success.

Supported by contemporary photographs, detailed maps, bird's eye views, and battlescene artwork, this title explores the key personalities, strategies, and significant engagements of the march, including the battles of Franklin and Nashville, and the ultimate fall of Savannah to the Union, to provide a detailed analysis of the campaign that marked the "beginning of the end" of the American Civil War.

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tactical withdrawals under Johnston had affected his men's fighting spirit, he saw Spring Hill as a confirmation that they were reluctant to attack a prepared defensive position. This was an injustice to his men, 47 who were equally disgusted that they had not been sent against the Union positions. Brigadier General Daniel C. Govan later wrote that "a fatal paralysis seemed to have seized those in command." Still fuming, Hood drove his disappointed and angry men after Schofield's withdrawing

ALLATOONA PASS, OCTOBER 5,1864 (Pages 10-11) Allatoona Pass was a man-made railroad cut near the small town of Allatoona, which served as a major Union supply depot. With a garrison of around 900 men it was not a soft target, but nevertheless an attainable one for the Confederate division led by Samuel French. Overnight, John M. Corse hurried 1,054 Federal reinforcements to the scene, evening the numbers on both sides, and the situation was finely balanced on the morning of October 5. The main

scoured for suitable mounts, while Thomas was bombarded with telegrams from Grant, urging him to attack. Thomas' reputation as "the Rock of Chickamauga" now worked against him. There was concern that he was capable only of stubborn defense, and the delay in attacking a clearly inferior enemy seemed to confirm this. On December 7 Grant delivered as clear an order as possible: "Attack Hood at once and await no longer the remount of your cavalry." Grant's concern was partiallyjustified. Too many

slower and surer process of starvation, I shall then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and shall make little effort to restrain my army - burning to avenge the national wrong which they attach to Savannah and other large cities which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil war. Sherman's threats do not reflect much credit on him, and Hardee's dignified refusal to surrender should have caused him some chagrin. The fact was, however, that plans were already

the right wing, XVII Corps, contained 11,087 officers and men and 271 artillerymen, split across three divisions, along with a small cavalry escort of 45 men. Total numbers for the right wing were therefore also over 27,000. Including Kilpatrick's 5,015-strong cavalry corps (a division in size), the aggregate strength of nearly 60,000 was ominous for the state of Georgia, with no large army on hand to resist. Davis had led XIV Corps since he took over from Major GeneralJohn M. Palmer during the

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