Popper's Theory of Science: An Apologia (Bloomsbury Studies in Philosophy)
Language: English
Pages: 192
ISBN: 0826490263
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
Popper's theory of science has been widely misunderstood and poorly represented in the literature on philosophy of science, over the last three decades. This book discusses the main issues in Popper's theory of science and, after giving a careful characterization of each issue, examines the main objections that have been raised against them and offers ways of circumventing them. It demonstrates that Popper's theory can guide us again to a better understanding of the aim and the structure of science.
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except on the assumption that having failed once it is likely to fail again?' Apparently, Ayer never considers the possibility of rejecting a theory simply because it is false, since he feels that falsificationism is unable to give a satisfactory answer to his questions. In the same fragment just quoted he adds: 30 Popper's Theory of Science It is true that there would be a contradiction in holding both that a hypothesis had been falsified and that it was universally valid; but there would be
statements, previously accepted, certain singular statements - 'which we may call 'predictions' - are deduced from the theory; especially predictions that are easily testable or applicable. From among these statements, those are selected which are not derivable from the current theory, and more especially those which the current theory contradicts. Next we seek a decision as regards these (and other) derived statements by comparing them with the results of practical applications and experiments.
a theoretical system as falsified, that is, he/she accepts that it has clashed with the world of experience. In other words, falsification has occurred if we accept basic observation statements that contradict a theory. But it is necessary to introduce some rules to determine whether this is the case. To begin with, Popper explains that a singular observation statement is not sufficient to conclude that a falsification may take place (nor that it has taken place, if accepted), because 'isolated
one must try to uncover its fallacy, that is to find a way to make the observation fit. To solve the difficulties, Galileo replaces the natural interpretation that causes trouble to the Copernican theory for a different interpretation; in so doing, he intro71 duces a new observation language. Since Feyerabend attributes such importance to historical cases in support of his criticisms of falsification, I must comment on the tenability of such analysis. Feyerabend's favourite example is Galileo,
distinction with regard to boundary conditions, which he takes as usually false (cf. Putnam 1974, p. 226). 42. Ibid., p. 225. Putnam contends that Popper ignores the role of AS. 43. Ibid., p. 227 (emphasis added). 44. Putnam spends about one third of his paper explaining Kuhn's views and examining the dispute between Popper and Kuhn. Since Putnam's strictures of corroboration do not depend on this topic, I will set it aside. 45. But this is not the sense in which Popper uses the notion of logical