Military Strategy and Operational Art, Joining the Fray: Outside Military Intervention in Civil Wars

Military Strategy and Operational Art, Joining the Fray: Outside Military Intervention in Civil Wars

Zachary C. Shirkey

Language: English

Pages: 229

ISBN: 2:00318049

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

Building on his earlier volume, Is this a Private Fight or Can Anybody Join?, Zachary C. Shirkey looks at how the decision to join a civil war can be intuitively understood as follows: given that remaining neutral was wise when a war began something must change in order for a country to change its beliefs about the benefits of fighting and join the war. This book studies what these changes are, focusing in particular on revealed information and commitment problems.

Army of the Potomac (Men-at-Arms, Volume 38)


Union Monitor 1861-65 (New Vanguard, Volume 45)





















as will be argued below, the game was largely up as the Russians had already decided to join the conflict. 6  Horvath 1934, 628. 7  Szábo 1999, 38. The Hungarian Revolution (1848–49) 49 Likewise, the French opted not to become involved on behalf of the Hungarians. Indeed, had they chosen to oppose Austria, their traditional foe, Italy would have been a more logical theater to do so. The French, however, were beset with their own internal difficulties and Russian recognition of the Second

and Importance of Military Intervention in Civil Wars 5 the presence of uncertainty and states’ ability to learn from information revealed by civil wars, there would be little reason for states to join civil wars well after they had begun. Rather, states would join very quickly or not at all. Thus, this work serves not only as an investigation of military intervention, but also as a test of bargaining theory in general. If bargaining theory fails to help illuminate why states become

Lebanese Civil War (1975–90) 73 Saudi subsidies and unemployment led to serious unrest in the northeast, including rioting in Hama.49 Lawson (1984) argues this precipitated Syrian intervention in Lebanon, but this view is not widely held. Syrian actions against the LNM and PLO were generally unpopular within Syria and there is little evidence Assad felt the conflict would be cheap or even decisive.50 Thus, it is not clear how the invasion can be painted as a policy to reduce unrest.

Lebanese political reforms would have to be undertaken in order to restore order.61 According to interviews conducted by Adeed Dawisha several years after the Syrian invasion, Syrian officials saw the whole situation as “extremely worrying” but not “desperate”.62 At this point, the Syrians, while still backing the LNM, were beginning to urge restraint, albeit somewhat cryptically by claiming restraint would be the best way to support the Palestinian resistance. In a press release, the Syrians

Mobutuera generals were detected spending considerable time in Kigali lobbying the Rwandan government, which the Angolan intelligence officials interpreted as lobbying for overthrowing Kabila and resuscitating a safe haven for UNITA in the Congo.102 Additionally, ex-FAZ troops were joining the Rwandan-led rebellion and participated in the lightning strike on Kinshasa suggesting the talks might have borne fruit.103 Even more worrisome was that Jonas Samvimbi, the head of UNITA, and Antonio Denbo,

Download sample