Israel's Security Networks: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective
Gabriel Sheffer, Oren Barak
Language: English
Pages: 182
ISBN: 110703468X
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, and particularly after the Israeli-Arab War of 1967, a highly informal but simultaneously potent security network has influenced Israel's domestic sphere. Composed of acting and former security personnel and their partners in the state's various civilian spheres, this security network has affected Israeli culture, politics, society, economy, public discourse, and foreign relations. This book discusses this major sociopolitical phenomenon and its effects in a comparative and theoretical perspective. First, it defines Israel's security network in a broad theoretical and comparative perspective. Second, it explains how Israel's security network emerged and acquired a hegemonic position in the area of national security and foreign policy. Third, it describes the security network and identifies its members. Fourth, it discusses and explains the multitude of roles that Israel's security network has come to play both domestically and externally. Fifth, it discusses similar phenomena in other relevant cases. Finally, it presents general analytical and theoretical conclusions.
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political parties, especially concerning decisions that are more directly connected to national security issues. One of the most important and indeed sensitive spheres in which this impact can be discerned is the appointment and dismissal of senior government ministers and security officials. The Resignation of Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Sharett The pressures that several members of the security network applied on former prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, Moshe Sharett, in
General, and, ultimately, of Israeli democracy. According to an editorial in Haaretz, by bringing about the cancellation of Galant’s appointment, “civil society in Israel proved its strength and its ability to stand up to aggressive politicians” and that this was “an achievement for Israeli democracy” (Haaretz January 30, 2011). Yet, it seems that unlike the first case discussed earlier, but much like many of the major decisions on war and peace in Israel since 1967, the Galant Affair was, above
Israeli media was flooded with reports on the excessive privileges of military personnel, including op-eds urging the government to introduce long-awaited reforms in the security sector (see, e.g., Haaretz March 14, 2003, May 27, 2003, July 24, 2003, August 28, 2003). 88 Israel’s Security Networks The original allocation for security purposes for 2003 had been 33.6 billion NIS (new Israeli shekels),5 but the security sector later was granted “supplements” that increased it to 36.5 billion
comptroller for starting the Iron Dome project without waiting for long months until all the bureaucratic steps were completed. (Haaretz April 17, 2011) However, the attempt made by members of the security network to justify the flawed policymaking process described above in “existential” terms, which, as shown in this book, is not untypical in the area of Israel’s national security, was not very convincing. Melman, who investigated the origins of the Iron Dome project, concludes: The behavior
rank of captain (Prime Minister’s Office n.d.). However, compared to other former security officialsturned-politicians in his party, the Likud, and in other parties, especially the Labor Party, this was a rather modest security background, which could turn into a political liability. Therefore, Netanyahu continuously sought to present himself as a security expert, on the one hand, and as a leader surrounded by other security experts, on the other hand. The first strategy can be gleaned from Prime