Gettysburg--Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill

Gettysburg--Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill

Harry W. Pfanz

Language: English

Pages: 528

ISBN: 0807849960

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

In this companion to his celebrated earlier book, Gettysburg--The Second Day, Harry Pfanz provides the first definitive account of the fighting between the Army of the Potomac and Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia at Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill--two of the most critical engagements fought at Gettysburg on 2 and 3 July 1863. Pfanz provides detailed tactical accounts of each stage of the contest and explores the interactions between--and decisions made by--generals on both sides. In particular, he illuminates Confederate lieutenant general Richard S. Ewell's controversial decision not to attack Cemetery Hill after the initial southern victory on 1 July. Pfanz also explores other salient features of the fighting, including the Confederate occupation of the town of Gettysburg, the skirmishing in the south end of town and in front of the hills, the use of breastworks on Culp's Hill, and the small but decisive fight between Union cavalry and the Stonewall Brigade.

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dispatch from Jubal Early to an unnamed cavalry colonel that said that Ewell would be in Heidlersburg, ten miles north of Gettysburg. The other, sent from Gettysburg, in16 THE ONLY POSITION Map 2.1. Gettysburg Campaign, 30 June-1 July formed Reynolds and Meade that a Confederate regiment had approached the town but had retired on the approach of Buford's cavalry.7 The two generals conferred until nearly 11:00 P.M., expecting to get orders for 1 July from army headquarters all the while. When

position could be held until night, it would be the best place for the army to fight on if the army was attacked." Hancock sent his aide, Maj. William G. Mitchell, back to Meade to tell him that he would hold the ground until night so that he could come forward and decide whether or not to fight there himself. After matters had been arranged to his satisfaction and he felt secure, Hancock sent another message back to Meade by Capt. Isaac B. Parker, another aide, with more detailed information

replacements for ranking officers lost in the battle or found wanting and sought to obtain greater efficiency by reducing the size of his corps. His solution for the latter was to reorganize his 75,000 troops into three corps of three divisions each and a cavalry division together with supporting artillery. With three exceptions, each infantry division would have four brigades. The artillery, formed into battalions, would be assigned to the three corps and to the cavalry. 4 TWO GENERALS AND

distress, she found that 104 SLOCUM AND H A N C O C K R E A C H THE F I E L D the house, which was practically on Schurz's line, was full of wounded, six of whom did not move. This was enough for her, and she returned to the gatehouse without the meat. In the meantime, the gatehouse had begun to fill with wounded soldiers too, and some were lying on her kitchen floor.50 The cemetery gatehouse, no common hostelry, had some distinguished visitors that evening. Howard, Slocum, and Sickles came to

1,300 officers and men and suffered 303 casualties. This high figure is a tribute to Union courage and Confederate marksmanship.53 In his report of the battle, Colonel Smith remarked that his men were engaged for three days and exposed to enemy fire not only from the front but also from sharpshooters in the town off to the right. He remarked that his main line, though posted behind a stone wall, was constantly annoyed by fire from the same source. In a sense, the report is almost as complimentary

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