Electoral Systems: Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures (Studies in Choice and Welfare)

Electoral Systems: Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures (Studies in Choice and Welfare)

Language: English

Pages: 352

ISBN: 3642204406

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub


Both theoretical and empirical aspects of single- and multi-winner voting procedures are presented in this collection of papers. Starting from a discussion of the underlying principles of democratic representation, the volume includes a description of a great variety of voting procedures. It lists and illustrates their susceptibility to the main voting paradoxes, assesses (under various models of voters' preferences) the probability of paradoxical outcomes, and discusses the relevance of the theoretical results to the choice of voting system.

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orderings among nine candidates are as follows: x y a b c d e f g. Here x is the Condorcet winner and hence will be elected according to Kemeny’s procedure. In district II there are seven voters whose preference orderings among the nine candidates are as follows: No. of voters 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 y y y e d c x x x x f e d b Preference ordering a b c d e g a b c d f g a b c g a b c d f g a b c e f g a b c d e f g f e d y y y a g f e x x x y These preference orderings can be depicted as the

demystifying voting paradoxes: social choice analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press. Satterthwaite, M. (1975). Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social choice functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 10, 187–217. Scarsini, M. (1998). A strong paradox of multiple elections. Social Choice and Welfare, 15, 237–238. Schultze, M. (2003). A new monotonic and clone-independent single-winner election method. Voting Counts, 17,

wds/homepage/rangevote.pdf Straffin, Ph.D. (1980). Topics in the theory of voting. Boston: Birkh¨auser. Tideman, T.N. (1987). Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 4, 185–206. Tideman, N. (2006). Collective decisions and voting: the potential for public choice. Aldershot: Ashgate. Young, H.P. (1974). An axiomatization of Borda’s rule. Journal of Economic Theory, 9, 43–52. Young, H.P. (1977). Extending Condorcet’s rule. Journal of Economic Theory, 16,

as an expression of a delayed temporary unconstitutionality, as the affected rule does not become void immediately but only if the law-making mandate is not realized within the set time limit. Regarding the law-making mandate of 3 July 2008, the Constitutional Court’s encroachment upon the legislator’s margin of discretion turns out to be even milder, also because it actually merely repeats and specifies the legislative mandate embodied in the constitution in Article 38 III of the Basic Law.

therefore suggests that PPMRC .3; n; p/ should also be expected to decrease. S Fishburn and Gehrlein (1980) show that PPMRC .3; 1; DC/ decreases as H.p/ increases for p vectors in DC when H.p/ is changed by keeping one of p1 , p2 or p3 fixed while changing the other two. Of course, p4 ,p5 and p6 must also change accordingly to keep p in accord with the definition of DC. An expected negative S relationship is also found between H.p/ and PPMRC .3; n; p/ for general p with independent voters, but

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