Classical Confucian Political Thought: A New Interpretation

Classical Confucian Political Thought: A New Interpretation

Loubna El Amine

Language: English

Pages: 232

ISBN: 0691163049

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub


The intellectual legacy of Confucianism has loomed large in efforts to understand China's past, present, and future. While Confucian ethics has been thoroughly explored, the question remains: what exactly is Confucian political thought? Classical Confucian Political Thought returns to the classical texts of the Confucian tradition to answer this vital question. Showing how Confucian ethics and politics diverge, Loubna El Amine argues that Confucian political thought is not a direct application of Confucian moral philosophy. Instead, contrary to the conventional view that Confucian rule aims to instill virtue in all members of society, El Amine demonstrates that its main aim is to promote political order.

El Amine analyzes key aspects of the Confucian political vision, including the relationship between the ruler and the people, the typology of rulers, and the role of ministers and government officials. She also looks at Confucianism's account of the mechanisms through which society is to be regulated, from welfare policies to rituals. She explains that the Confucian conception of the political leaves space open for the rule of those who are not virtuous if these rulers establish and maintain political order. She also contends that Confucians defend the duty to take part in government based on the benefits that such participation can bring to society.

Classical Confucian Political Thought brings a new understanding to Confucian political theory by illustrating that it is not chiefly idealistic and centered on virtue, but rather realistic and driven by political concerns.

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As he puts it, “Since man came into this world, no one has succeeded in inciting children against their parents.”133 The naturalness of people’s filial sentiments is also suggested in Mencius’s account of the emergence of burials for parents: “Presumably there must have been cases in ancient times of people not burying their parents. When the parents died, they were thrown in the gullies. Then one day the sons passed the place and there lay the bodies, eaten by foxes and sucked by flies. A sweat

anecdote above, one is not asked to withdraw from society. Two differences, however, distinguish this case from that of Shun above: first, the person concerned is not a ruler, so he is not the representative of the “law” as such. Second, the man’s father did not kill anyone; he just stole a sheep.152 These differences explain why filiality is upheld here without any qualifiers. In conclusion, though the move from family obligations to political obligations is fraught with tension, the Confucian

arose “when the vast scale and unprecedented scope of sociopolitical and economic changes occurring at the time drew attention to two issues: what form of equitable distribution would best serve as foundation for a stable state? and what methods of rule would allow the expanding states to integrate new populations?”160 I disagree with Nylan on the centrality she gives to the idea of “pleasure” as such,161 but agree with her emphasis on the political importance of ritual. As Nylan explains, the

thrown into the Yangzi.32 The fear of a fate similar to Zixu’s notwithstanding, Xunzi admonishes ministers to remonstrate. But the call to remonstrate is not merely a blank call on the part of Xunzi. It is a layered, conditional, and qualified call. First, obedience and disobedience are both dependent on benefiting the ruler (not personally, but rather in his pursuit of political order). So when a minister follows the commands of the ruler for the ruler’s benefit, this is “obedience,” but

Reward Mencius lays out three conditions for taking, and relinquishing, office. The first condition stipulates that the gentleman should be “sent for with the greatest respect, in accordance with the proper rites,” and that he should be “told that his advice would be put into practice.” This is reminiscent of the idea expressed in Mencius 5B.7, and discussed in Chapter 4, of ministers who “cannot be summoned” but should rather be sought after because of their virtue. On this first condition,

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